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Presents

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Einsatzgruppen part 2
Why Hitler invaded the USSR

Sans Concession tv
Editorials tv
In the first part of this video, I explain that in September 1939, Hitler had been embedded in an extented war he feared. So a question can be asked: Why, on June 21, 1941, did he broke the non-aggression pact that brought him the USSR's kindness?

Many of you asked this primordial question. A detractor claimed to answer in invoking "Mein Kampf". "Mein Kampf", that he certainly didn't read, otherwise he would have hastened to quote the passage. Here's the passage (Mein Kampf, p.653): Hitler declared that Jewish-Bolshevik regime, had eliminated the Russian intellectual class, which enabled the perpetuation of the Russian state, therefore he believed that the USSR would collapse by itself, and that Germans would only have to penetrate in its vast territories to restore order, by the sword, and cultivate lands with the plow. Here is thus, what Hitler's wrote in 1924.

But, in 1941, his prediction had in no way been realized quite the contrary. Bolshevik regime was still there and well there. Consequently, the Führer couldn't rely on "Mein Kampf", to justify the entry into the Soviet Union.

However, let us go further, yes. Let's suppose that this page could be considered as the ideological justification of an invasion on the East.

Forgive me for being so frank dear detractor, But, do you really believe that in June 1941, Hitler would have said to himself: "Well, in 1924, I wrote that it should be necessary to invade the USSR one day another. Time has come to realize this aspiration." I remind you that in 1939 (Doc PS-798), Hitler had declared that according to him, England wouldn't be ready for war until two or three years.

I remind you as well, that thanks to this Polish document and many others too, Hitler knew that since 1939, the USA was rearming to an accelerated rate, with the objective to go to war against totalitarian states.
So, in June 1941, Hitler that was embedded in an extended conflict, a conflict he feared, a life or death struggle, Hitler, as I said, saw coming the time, when the Anglo-American war machinery will start to move. I'll talk about it in a few minutes, but one thing is certain, in such moments, ideologies don't make any differences, one struggle to survive, therefore, to take the advantage, and one pertinently mocked what could have been written 17 years before, while one was in jail in a fare more different context.

Here, some would say to me: "But, if Hitler feared the American intervention, it was not the time to attack his Soviet ally."

Naturally, and this apparently contradictory initiative, demonstrates that it was an emergency decision. A last resort decision in which you risk all for all. So, what really happened?

Interrogated in August 1945 (TMI, red series, suppl.B,p.1187-1188), the former minister of Reich Foreign Affairs, Joachim Von Ribbentrop, underlined that even before the end of the France campaign, the firsts concerns arised due to USSR real intentions.

I invite viewers to read the document C-170. It's a folder established by the high command of German's Navy, about German and Russian relationships. Strictly internals, it was not at all for propaganda intents. By reading it, we discover that as early as June 1940, the sudden Soviets progresses made in the Baltic states, and in Bessarabia were worrisome, because it was regarding states on which the USSR promised to have no influence on.

Let's resume all this on a map. In October and November 1939, the USSR had concluded pacts, known as "assistance pacts", with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Well.
End of November, she invades Finland, that had refused to recognize the puppet government of Kuusinen. The peace signed in March forced Finland, to cede her South West provinces, that were immediately bolshevized.

On June 15, 1940, while Germany was still fighting against France, the USSR addressed an ultimatum to Lithuania, then invaded it totally, including the part that was recognized as the Reich's sphere of influence.

Shortly after, this script repeated itself with Estonia and Latvia.

In the meantime, on June 28, 1940, following another ultimatum, the USSR had invaded the Bessarabia, a Romanian province.

More seriously, from summer 1940, Germany heard about secrets negotiations, Russo-British, AND Russo-Yugoslav.

On November 14, the USSR started to secretly deliver weapons to Yugoslavians opponents. Until now, all was kept hidden.

But, on January 17, 1941, the FIRST major official diplomatic incident took place, between THE USSR and Germany. As the Reich armies prepared themselves to cross Bulgaria to go to Greece, to avoid any Britannic landing, the USSR emitted a protestation, declaring that Bulgaria was a Soviet safe zone, and that she warned against the appearance of troops in that region. And when, in March, Germans troops crossed Bulgaria, the USSR protested against this infringement against her security, she said, adding that she wouldn't do nothing to support the German initiative.

On the same month, the USSR gave a secret cover to Turkey, in case the latter would enter into war in the Balkans. this agreement followed the British Minister of Foreign Affairs visit in Ankara. It was the proof that the USSR had now entered the allied coalition.

In April at last, the Deputy Commissioner of the people to Foreign Affairs, Vichinsky, tried to -during confidential interviews with the Rumanian ambassador in Moscow- to establish a policy of fast rapprochement with Romania, and to untie that country from the Reich.

The 5th of that same month, the USSR concluded a friendship treaty with the Yugoslavian insurrectional government, presided by the Serbian Simonovich. But, contrary to his predecessor, Salkovitch, Simonovitch was hostile to the Reich.

This friendship pact, and protestations made after the Bulgarians events, violated the spirit of the Germano-Sovietic friendship treaty, signed on September 28, 1939.

But there was worse.
Since January 1941, more frequent incursions of Soviet planes, above the borders regions were reported. They often were reconnaissance aircrafts. Reconnaissance operations also occurred on the ground by Soviets soldiers. From spring, their cadences were accelerating.

On May 11, 1941, the Army high command pulled the alarm signal. During months he assisted to the concentration of Russians herds in border regions. This synthetic chart fully demonstrated it. To resume the most important points, I have extracted the following diagram.

One note the enormous rising, between 1939 and 1941, of the amount of infantry divisions, in the Germans-Russians borders regions, while elsewhere, no concentration could have been noticed.

At Nuremberg, (TMI, green series, vol.XIV,p.147 and 155) the lawyer of the former secretary general to the four-years-plan, Paul Koerner, compiled in a book the documents that, he said, demonstrated that in triggering the USSR invasion, Hitler only avoided an imminent Soviet attack. But first, in a written statement, General Walrimont had also stated that: "without any doubt, the USSR was arming against Germany. Especially with the construction of air bases near the borders."

Besides, I note that in his letter from October 28, 1941, addressed to Mussolini, Hitler clearly wrote that Soviets have concentrated their forces on the borders, to prepare an attack against Germany, that forced them to fight on an unfavourable ground, and prevented them to organize an effective retreat. Please note that this letter found and translated by the victors in 1945, stayed confidential and was not used at Nuremberg, because the attack on the USSR had to be presented, as an unjustified aggression coming from the Evil Nazi.
A map confirms Hitler's assertions, Deployment of concentrated troops made Red Army very vulnerable. A slight push would be sufficient to bypass and encircle five armies. See the red arrow on the map.

The 9th army had to seize Roumania, and Rumanian's oil, depriving the Reich of its raw material essential to the war. The 12th and the 18th Army of Mountain, had to lock the Carpathians in Slovakia. All the others had to lead to Poland and Germany.

Knowing all these factors, it's difficult to maintain that they only were defensive measures took by Stalin. But once more, let's admit, yes, let's admit that they only were defensive measures.

We must still recognize that with such troops concentrations, infantry, and motorized troops, without counting nearby air bases, it was an easy thing to move from a defensive to an offensive position.

Therefore, one thing is certain, as early as July 1940, when he decided an offensive against Soviet Union, Hitler was certain to face a great danger. That's why on that time, he asked to military to engage a preventive war against the USSR. At first, he wished to trigger it before the end of the year, but, the opposition of General Jodl, made him changed his mind. Thus, he decided to act during the spring 1941, in May more exactly, as soon as the weather would allow it.

In invoking the great Bolshevism danger, was Hitler wrong or right? In the context of this presentation: it doesn't matter. The key is to put ourselves in the situation of the time.
On June 1941, the Führer was convinced that the USSR was about to strike Germany on its back.

Therefore, in his spirit, despite his diplomats and military victories, Germany was threatened by two gigantic empires: the British Empire and the Soviet Empire. The situation was critical, and it was thus imperative to act, to avoid being caught in a fatal stranglehold.

In his memoirs, (p.186) Joachim Von Ribbentrop explained that the Führer knew, that one day or another, he would have to face the entire American-Britannic military potential. On September 30, 1939 (Documents Tambach), he said to General Raeder that in the case of a long war, the USA would surely intervene, and that, everything had to be done to delay that moment.

That's why Hitler considered himself obliged to neutralize the Soviet threat, before the gigantic Americano-Britannic machinery started to move. Yet, he was not sure of himself: "Even if we have to force doors, " he declared to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, "on the East, we ignore what's behind them." Despite the risk, Hitler ordered the assault of the giant Soviet because he estimated the situation sufficiently critical.

In his trial, the former leader of Einzatsgruppe A (TMI, green series, vol.IV,p.246), spoke about a "state of emergency", and added that the war against the USSR was: "A state of war emergency and of self-defense"

We are far from the popular picture of "Nazis proud of themselves and imperialists" If they could depicted it to the public, in the higher private spheres, it was known that decision were taken in the emergency, and that the future was played on a roll of dice. But, in an ideological extermination war, mistake was forbidden.
That's why on December 18, *(Doc 446-PS)* 1940 Hitler stated that: "German Army must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign, before the end of war against England." Understand: before the Anglo-American war machinery starts to move.

In that case, rapidity was a crucial element. because in the case of a failure, it was the war on two fronts, with the specter of defeat, as the future will demonstrate.

But, without even consider the ideological aspect, the German higher command knew that the war that was opening will be different, and let's say it straight away: really cruel. For two main reasons.

First of all, purely material reason. Already engaged on many fronts, Germany didn't have the sufficient resources, to storm the Soviet Empire. In a report redacted in November 1945, several high ranking Germans wrote that the news of the Barbarossa operation, didn't rejoice the Army. It was impossible that "the resources of the German nation could be sufficient, to endure such an extension of military operations." Hence, incidentally the need to overcome quickly very quickly.

But even so, on May 2, 1941, different Secretaries of State brought together came to the conclusion *(Doc PS-2718)*: that a third year of war would require to seize in Russia, of their supplies to feed the armies. It will fatally result, they said, in a famine that will cause the death of millions.

To this, it must be added the partisans warfare of which Russia was customary. At Nuremberg, *(TMI, green series, vol.X,p.185)* a lawyer recalled it, and underlined, that this guerrilla on huge spaces, had been fatal to Napoleon. Therefore, the necessity to pacify as fast as possible, the conquered territories, to avoid any strike in the back.

That's why in his March 13, 1941 directive *(Doc PS-447)* Hitler's ordered that the area operation extent should be limited to their maximum with the necessity to fight the enemy political regime.

Two week later in a conference *(Doc. NOKW-3140)*, he recalled the danger of communism and clearly stated, that it was an ideological extermination war. The Führer added that it should be needed to "exterminate the Bolshevists commissars, and of the Communist Intelligentsia with the same methods that these people employed". This explains the appearance of the famous Einzatsgruppens created on April 28, 1941, which is a few weeks before the Barbarossa operation, their mission was clear, on the military operations theatre, they had to:

1) Secure all documentary materials about the enemy;

2) Discover and neutralized Germany's enemy, both integrated to the Army or civilians.
Depending on police service, the Einzatsgruppen, thus operated on the rear front, but really close to it. To summarize: these special groups had two missions: intelligence and pacification. There was nothing criminal here.

Historians affirmed that others instructions were orally given, including to systematically exterminate the Jews. Really convenient those oral orders, they spare the proof obligation. Anyway, German's headquarter fears about the cruelty of the war were finally justified. Since the firsts days of the invasion, hundred of reports arrived, to expose serious violations of the laws of war by the Red Army.

Military hospitals or infirmaries attacks even though they where signaled as such; assassination of defenceless military personnells; like here: the stretcher bearer Herbert F. ill-treatments on war prisoners, which are undressed, beaten, and who are denied water; In multiple occasions, soldiers that surrendered were summarily executed.

As here, on July 1st, 1941, not far from Bronicki, where a hundred of soldiers had been assassinated. At the time, German Army documented these war crimes, and leaded investigations, via the Wehrmacht office, specialized in those cases.

Sometimes, enemy's documents felled into Germans hands, that confirmed these crimes, as this operation report of July 13, 1941, coming from the Russian 26th armoured division. One learned that on July 10, a German unit lost 400 men during the fights. The author continued: "80 men who surrendered were shot." He mentioned this as a normal fact, that didn't require any explanations, or justifications.

But the most awful concerned tortures inflicted to POWs, more particularly to defenceless and wounded. Here again: In the early days, numerous reports reached the authorities, talking about horrible mutilations. Sliced limbs with an ax; Soldering iron's burns; Testicles crushing; skulls smashed with rifle butts; Decapitation; Evisceration to bring out the intestines; Eyes
gouged out after other tortures; In some cases, eyes had bluntly been taken out from their sockets by the torturers. Near Mosty, 17 wounded had been finished with rifle butts, that smashed their skulls.

Fighting methods were already horrible, but, on July 3, 1941, in a broadcast speech, (TMI, green series, vol.X, p.185-186) "Stalin summoned the Russian people to partisan warfare. The enemy had to be annihilated, with no mercy; no prisoners were to be taken." So, very quickly, the war reduplicated in cruelty, Very far from what it used to be in Poland or in France.

In this report of July 5, 1941, soldiers reported that, according to what had been said by Russians to ethnics Germans civilians, soldiers reported that, according to what had been said by Russians to ethnics Germans civilians, living in a farm; Soviets soldiers were killing all the wounded Germans prisoners. Not far from there, they found two horribly mutilated corpses. To one of them, among multiples wounds inflicted with a prickly object, they cut off his tongue an insert an iron bar, between the chin and the chest, that partially ripped off the head.

This other report of July 6, 1941, mentioned a wounded soldier, that had been left behind the time to fetch a stretcher. but in the meantime, Russians arrived, the unfortunate had been found, with the rib cage perforated, his torturers had torn his liver off before lacerated it.

There, according to a report of July 10, 1941, two Jews wearing the uniforms of political commissars, had tortured to death two severely wounded SS. They mostly scalped them and snatched the soft parts of the head.

Some will talk about of false reports or propaganda. I redirect them to Alfred De Zayas' book, devoted to the Wehrmacht office, in charge of the war crimes investigations.
The author explained that most of its members, were military unfavourable to National-socialism, that were assigned here to be put to pasture, as the saying goes, and they did their work with a great objectivity.

The hundreds reports, received from the firsts two weeks of the German-Russian conflict, demonstrated that, the German headquarters fears were justified. The war will be cruel led out of peoples rights. In that conflict where rules vanished, Einzatsgruppens rapidly engaged a fierce struggle against partisans.

On his side, Hitler took note of Staline decision. During a conference, given on July 16, 1941 (Doc L-221), he stated: "The Russians have now ordered partisan warfare behind our front. This partisan war has again some advantage for us; it enables us to eradicate everyone who opposes us."

Soon after, Marshal Keitel specified that: "The habitants [...] who did not perform their duties properly, knew that they will be shot, and that they will be held responsible for each offense [against Germans]."

In a report from August 1941 (Doc. L-180 annex 9), a SS General defended the tactic of "terror against terror", he explained that "villagers recognized guilty of helping partisans were shot, then their houses burned in the presence of the entire population. They were then warned if the same facts reproduced, all the village would be burned with no exception."

In multiples times, villages were burned by Red Army which, in its precipitated retreat, practiced the scorched earth tactic to suppress all resources to the adversary. This practice sometimes had terrible results.
Devoid of refueling, of infrastructures that had been destroyed and of equipments, Germans were sometimes obliged to make room.

In Poltava for example (Doc. NO-2827), between October 31 and November 5, 1941, the Einzats Kommando 4b, killed almost 600 mentally ill people, to clear the asylum so that it could be used by military hospital. As for the recuperated clothes, they would be redistributed to hospitals. Let's note however, that 200 lighter mentally deficient were spared, and placed in surrounding farms to work.

Proof that they did not kill for kill, but for circumstantial reasons without any connection to ideology.

Among the documents of the same type let's quote the one that dealt with the Markarevskaja asylum (TMI, green series, vol.X.p.1196). Early December 1941, Germans discovered a former monastery, that was reconverted in asylum since 1936. About 230 to 240 women lived there, mentally deficient, epileptic, and syphilitic. A medical assistant and a director took care of them the best they could. Food supplies were nearly exhausted, and medicines were non existent. Knowing also that patients could freely leave the place, they constituted an epidemic and contamination danger, not only for the local population, but also to Germans soldiers stationed in the area, to ensure the fight against partisans. Dealing with such situation, the asylum were liquidated with the inmates. We note however, that it took three weeks of discussions, for the terrible decision could finally be taken.

So, in that case they didn't kill by ideology, but by necessity.

We can imagine without difficulties, the horror of this war on the East, lead in violation of international laws. But, in that war that had globalized, the Jews was always depicted as the hidden enemy behind hostiles empires.

To be continued...